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Abstract 
This commentary is a response to Dekker’s insightful article in this issue on Situational Awareness 
(SA).  This is a concept that continues to excite strong debate but only because of the profound 
implications for the theoretical foundations and the effects that different approaches have for the 
work of human factors practitioners.  We argue that Dekker’s paper tacitly adopts one approach to 
SA, and in doing so will inevitably arrive at the point of questioning the concept in its entirety.  If SA 
really is as deterministic and ‘broken component’ orientated as Dekker describes then we would be 
in complete agreement, but instead we offer a counterpoint.  We apply our Distributed Situational 
Awareness (DSA) approach to the key issues raised,answer all of Dekker’s concerns, and offer a 
useful way forward.   
 
Situation awareness 
Situation Awareness is being discussed again (Dekker, this issue).  What is the point?  To the casual 
observer there is surely nothing left to say?  The discipline has a dominant account of the concept, 
one in widespread use within academia and industry, moreover, one that is simple, tractable and 
appears to make intuitive sense.  Dekker’s paper tells us, once again, that behind the scenes 
Situation Awareness might not be as fully resolved, or even as fundamentally useful, as we might 
think (Flach, 1995; Patrick and Morgan, 2010; Salmon et al, 2008; Salmon and Stanton, 2013).  The 
main problem for Dekker (this issue) seems to be the frequency with which situation awareness is 
cited as a direct causal factor in the aftermath of adverse events.  The paper asks whether we should 
be worried when we encounter terms such as ‘loss of situation awareness’, ‘lack of situation 
awareness’, ‘degraded situation awareness’ or ‘poor situation awareness’ in accident investigation 
reports.  Or when it is put forward as a key causal factor in military friendly fire incidents (Rafferty et 
al., 2013),aircraft crashes (e.g. Jones and Endsley, 1996) crashes between cars and trains at rail level 
crossings (e.g. Salmon et al, 2013) and maritime incidents (e.g. Grech et al., 2002).  The answer, 
according to Dekker, is yes.   
 
For well over half a century we have travelled away from simply ‘blaming the operators’ to instead 
considering a set of more systemic factors.  From Heinrich (1931) to Rasmussen (1997) and beyond, 
the system boundaries have continually expanded in order to permit a richer critique of how events 
‘emerge’ from interacting factors, and without having to take the system apart in order to reach this 
understanding.  In current usage, however, ‘loss of situation awareness’ could be a regressive term.  
If it does not place responsibility squarely on the shoulders of individuals who ‘lost’ situation 
awareness then it certainly focusses attention on the human rather than the system as a whole 
(Jones and Endsley, 1996).  If one considers situation awareness to be something that resides 
exclusively in the heads of individuals then it is quite literally ‘on the shoulders’ of people, and more 
often than not those at the front-line, such as pilots, air traffic controllers, and drivers rather than 
CEO’s, entire organisations, or emergent properties that have no convenient structural category to 
fall in to (Walker et al, 2009).   
 
Dekker (this issue) discusses several important and potentially disturbing moral and ethical issues 
associated with the use of the concept in this way. His thought-provoking article, and others like it 
(Flach, 1995), bring into question whether the concept is even useful at all.  This article is a response.  
We are of the view that situation awareness ‘is’ a useful concept.  In many respects we agree almost 
entirely with Dekker’s analysis as it is described, however, the underlying issue is that situation 
awareness has become so closely wedded to a particular theory that people make the mistake of 
seeing it as one and the same thing.  It is not.  Dekker’s paper presents an excellent analysis and 
argument but offers no solution.  We put forward our work in Distributed Situation Awareness (DSA) 
as a candidate.  This short article reflects DSA off the key issues Dekker sets out in his paper (this 
issue) so that researchers and practitioners in this realm can judge for themselves.   
 
The component view versus the systems level view 
Dekker’s article centres on the notion that it is wrong to examine broken components in the 
aftermath of accidents, and therefore attributing blame to human operators for ‘losing situation 
awareness’ is also wrong (Dekker, 2011; this issue).  Safety and accidents are shaped by the 
decisions of all actors, not just the front line workers in isolation, and accidents are caused by 
multiple contributing factors, not just one bad decision or action (Reason, 1990; Rasmussen, 1997). 
They are emergent properties arising from non-linear interactions between multiple components 
across complex sociotechnical systems (e.g. Leveson, 2004).  This ‘systems view’ is not new.  It is 
widely accepted, indeed, it resides at the core of the discipline of human factors itself and has done 
ever since its modern origins (Trist and Bamforth, 1951).  It is hardly surprising, therefore, that when 
a model of situation awareness which foregrounds the role of individual cognition is put in contact 
with highly systemic problems, that Dekker feels serious ethical and moral problems arise.  The 
differences between alternative models of situation awareness are highly contentious (Endsley, In 
Press).  On the one hand Endsley (In Press) puts forward seven fallacies which it is felt other models 
fall into and promulgate through the literature, causing confusion.  On the other hand is the much 
simpler idea that due to the complexity of socio-technical systems that form the subject of much 
contemporary analysis, the study of information processing in the mind of individuals has lost 
relevance (Hollnagel, 1993).  Endsley and colleagues have made unquestionably good progress on 
numerous thorny psychological issues around their model, but we contend there is a much more 
elegant solution:  instead of looking at the information processing of a person embedded in a 
situation, look instead at the interactions or transactions that take place between actors.  From 
nodes to links: this is the main essence of DSA.   
 
Situation awareness is a systems phenomenon, not an individual operator one 
In addition to Dekker’s viewpoint (this issue), recurring arguments against situation awareness and 
its measurement include that it is not possible to accurately describe the awareness held by 
somebody else, nor is it meaningful to examine the mind independently from the world (Dekker, 
2010; 2013; Hutchins, 1995; James, 1890), and finally, as researchers and experimenters, we simply 
cannot know exactly what it is that other people know as it exists within their own heads (Dekker, 
2010; 2013). All of these arguments, however, become moot when situation awareness is 
considered as a systems phenomenon; that is, situation awareness resides within the overall system 
and not solely in the individuals undertaking work (Salmon et al, 2009; Stanton et al, 2006).  
 
This viewpoint allows situation awareness to be approached from a different perspective.  Rather 
than try and understand the ‘component’ humans in the system by analysing their individual 
cognition, requiring ever more experimental complexity and effort to do so, DSA bypasses this by 
focussing on the interactions and ‘transactions’ between them.  The powerful criticism that 
practitioners cannot see inside people’s heads is thus avoided simply because there is no need to. By 
focussing on these ‘transactions’, which as we know from Hutchin’s (1995) pioneering work in 
Distributed Cognition are between humans and artefacts as well as other humans, it is possible to 
build a network comprising concepts and the relationships between them.  These concepts are 
founded on ‘transactional memory’ which discovered the reliance on people to have other people 
(Wegner, 1986) and machines remember for them (Sparrow et al, 2011).  We extend this notion to 
people and objects in networks.  This ‘situation awareness network’ represents the system’s DSA 
and through further interrogation it is possible to determine who in the system has access to what 
knowledge at different points in time (e.g. Stanton et al, 2006).  The outputs can be illuminating.  
Being completely naturalistic, with no task interruptions or other significant experimental artifices, 
the analysis is strongly data driven, shedding light not on what people should do, but what they 
actually do (Salmon et al, 2008; Stanton et al, 2006; Walker et al, 2010); into affordances embedded 
in the system (Walker, Stanton & Chowdhury, 2013), and how to design a system so the required 
information/awareness is in the places it needs to be (Stanton et al, 2009).  The results have been 
successfully translated into numerous domains and welcomed by researchers who have not been 
able to make progress with existing approaches (Bourbousson et al, 2011; Fioratou et al, 2010; 
Golightly et al, 2010; Golightly et al, 2013; Macquet and Stanton, 2014; Patrick and Morgan, 2010 
and others). 
 
It is the system that ‘loses’ situation awareness, not individual operators 
Let us return to Dekker’s moral and ethical dilemmas and the tendency for the dominant dialogue in 
situation awareness to foreground the role of people who lose situation awareness (rather than the 
system).  The dominant dialogue is emblematic of Dekker’s ‘broken component’ view of accident 
causation (Dekker, 2011).  How often are we told that a pilot was not aware of the plane’s altitude, 
that a truck driver wasn’t aware a train was approaching the rail level crossing, or that a battle group 
weren’t aware that a group of their own men were located on the other side of the canal? In such 
circumstances ‘loss of situation awareness’ by human operators has to be the primary cause doesn’t 
it? 
 
No. The distributed situation awareness viewpoint is in total agreement with Dekker on this point. 
Loss of situation awareness by any individual cannot possibly be labelled as the cause of an accident. 
Not because loss of situation awareness doesn’t happen, rather, it is not useful.  The system loses 
situation awareness and not the individuals working within it.Distributed situation awareness is held 
by the system, it is built through interactions between components, both human and non-human, 
therefore it is an emergent property. In most meaningful contexts SA is not something that can be 
held by one individual alone, and therefore cannot be lost by one individual alone.  Let us zoom out 
to the bigger picture.  Let us say a person did lose awareness, and let us further say we will 
implement some form of counter measure.  Problem solved?  Perhaps not.  The strategic issue we 
are faced with in many safety critical domains is a persistent class of accident which continues to 
bounce back ‘despite’ well intentioned counter measures like these (Walker et al, 2009; EASA, 2010; 
CAA, 2011; RSSB, 2009).  It was by working at precisely this interface that the DSA concept emerged 
(Stanton et al, 2006) and has made progress ever since.   
 
Broken components versus broken systems 
The systems level view demands a different approach to accident investigation.  When loss of 
situation awareness seems to have played a role in an adverse event, the accident investigator 
needs to examine the overall system to determine the why, not the who. Why is it that the pilot, the 
truck driver, the commander were not aware of something important? When ‘loss of situation 
awareness’ takes place, is it not appropriate to begin with the individual and try to expand outwards. 
Rather, a DSA approach is required, whereby one starts with the system and focuses inwards (if 
necessary).  The recent Kerang rail level crossing tragedy that occurred in Victoria, Australia, 
provides a compelling example. Here the driver of a loaded semi-trailer truck continued toward a rail 
level crossing apparently unaware that a passenger train was also approaching (Salmon et al, 2013). 
The resulting collision killed 11 train passengers and injured a further 15 people, including the truck 
driver.  
 
Following an exhaustive investigation the Office of the Chief Investigator concluded that the train 
and train crew, the truck, the road and rail infrastructure, and the rail level crossing warning devices 
all played no causal role in the incident (OCI, 2007). They commented that, “for reasons not 
determined the truck driver did not respond in an adequate time and manner to the level crossing 
warning devices” (OCI, p. 72). In short, his lack of ‘situation awareness’ regarding the approaching 
train was focussed on. He was subsequently prosecuted on the basis that he had failed to keep a 
proper lookout. After pleading not guilty to eleven counts of culpable driving causing death and 
eight counts of negligently causing serious injury he was acquitted by a jury.  
 
The broken component approach criticised by Dekker (this issue) could not fully explain the incident. 
More worryingly, it did not fully account for the role of other decision makers and non-human 
components (e.g. warnings, risk assessment tools, incident reporting systems). Worst of all, it did not 
produce design recommendations that would improve performance and safety. Instead, the rail 
level crossing was subsequently modified to include boom gates, Light Emitting Diode (LED) lights, 
rumble strips, and active advanced warning signs. This component fix response suggests strongly 
that the rail industry felt that the truck driver was broken; the appropriate response was therefore 
to try and ‘fix’ him with yet more warning devices.  Experience tells us, however, that this 
component fix approach does not prevent accidents from continuing to bounce back and haunt us 
(e.g RSSB, 2009), and it is precisely these types of accidents that are becoming of strategic concern 
and for which a systemic approach is required. 
 
In the example above it turns out the system was indeed broken (and more than likely still is). 
Examination of the investigation report through a DSA lens revealed that various interactions 
enabled the loss of situation awareness (Salmon et al, 2013). For example, there was a lack of 
communication across the system regarding previous near miss incidents at the rail level crossing. 
The risk assessment tool provided an assessment that did not raise sufficient concern regarding 
safety at the crossing; this in turn ensured the crossing would not be upgraded to full boom barriers 
for some time, and budgetary constraints limiting crossing upgrades exacerbated this. Physical 
features at the crossing obscured the approaching train. The loss of situation awareness was the 
systems fault, not the truck driver’s.  Having driven the same route as part of his job once a week for 
seven years without experiencing an approaching train, the truck driver checked the flashing lights 
and didn’t perceive them to be flashing. How can the truck driver be blamed when the onus was on 
the system to support his tasks  in that context, at that time, with those factors present? The 
transaction wasn’t achieved. The system had lost situation awareness, not the truck driver  , and the 
implications flowing from this extend far beyond simple engineering counter-measures (Salmon et 
al, 2013). This supports Dekker’s vision that human factors practitioners will defend the accused. The 
distributed situation awareness approach sits squarely on the side of the human operator; the 
individual cognition view could end up as the human operators’ enemy and prosecutor.  We can, 
however, see that the idea of SA residing within individuals makes the system designers and system 
operators feel safe.  Any problem, simply remove the faulty component operator and carry on with 
business as usual.  To take the systems view would raise fundamental questions about system design 
and operation – questions which would have profound implications and require considerable 
redesign and changes in operation. 
 
The future 
How do Dekker’s key issues look now?  Dekker criticises the circularityof complacency, attentional 
bias and loss of situation awareness as follows: 
 
Why did you lose situation awareness?  
Because you were complacent. 
How do we know you were complacent? 
Because you lost situation awareness. 
 
From the systems level viewpoint, this circularity is removed, replaced by the following: 
 
Why did the system lose situation awareness? 
Because it’s an emergent property of sociotechnical systems. 
How do we know its emergent? 
Because it’s not reducible down to the level of ‘individual cognition’ 
 
How does Dekker’s hypothetical scenario in which a doctor is blamed for a patient’s death because 
they lost situation awareness look when compared with distributed situation awareness? 
 
Q. Wouldn’t you agree, doctor, that accurate situation awareness by the system in which you work 
like yours is integral for providing optimal performance during the treatment of patients? This is 
what the leading journal in your specialty claims. See, here it says so [counsel points to exhibit].  
A. Uh, I’d have to agree. 
Q. Would you say, doctor, that the performance of the system in this case, in which your patient 
died as a result of the care you provided, was optimal? 
A. Uh, we all hoped for a different outcome. 
Q. Were you, or were you not aware of the situation that this particular drug X, when used in 
combination with Y and Z, had produced problems for this patient eighteen years before, when she 
was living in another State? 
A. I was not aware of that at the time, no; however, the system may have been, but there was no 
transaction of awareness between components. I mean, the information was held ‘somewhere’ in 
the system, but it didn’t get to me. The system failed. 
Q. Yet you agreed that accurate situation awareness is integral for providing optimal performance 
during the treatment of patients? 
A. Yes I do, but situation awareness doesn’t reside exclusively in my or my surgical team’s heads, it is 
distributed around the system.  The system as a whole is designed to get that information to me but 
it didn’t.   
Q. Thank you. In that case I have no option but to call the next fourteen witnesses all together, 
hereafter referred to as ‘the system’ (the designer, the trainer, the computer programmer, the chief 
executive, the nurses, the anaesthetist, etc.) and as exhibits we would like to present all of the 
computer systems and documents associated with the patient’s notes and medication.  The jury is 
asked to consider how this system of people and technology could lead to an outcome like this, and 
what lessons we can learn for the future. 
 
Conclusion 
Situation awareness is a key concept for safety science. Dekker’s thought provoking article (this 
issue) is quite correct in criticising the component level view of situation awareness and the danger 
associated with identifying ‘loss of situation awareness’ by human operators. As he points out, 
human factors and safety research has always been on the side of the human operator and the 
inappropriate use of terms such as loss of situation awareness in accident investigations threaten 
this (Dekker, 2013; this issue). We agree.   DSA as a systems-level solution to situation awareness 
(Salmon et al, 2009; Stanton et al, 2006) has been put forward to show that practitioners can still 
continue  to champion the SA construct, but to champion it as a systems level phenomenon, not a 
component level one.  This will keep the discipline where it needs, and wants, to be: as an advocate 
for humans in systems and as a solution to the real underlying issues.   
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